The EU has not yet found effective answers to constitutional crises in its Member States, in particular Hungary and Poland. Due to systemic problems of compliance with the common values of Art. 2, the legitimacy of the EU constitutional order and its smooth functioning are under threat, but the EU lacks instruments of direct enforcement and coercion. Several authors have therefore proposed to 'federalize' EU mechanisms and to guarantee to EU institutions, in particular the Court of Justice, more powers to intervene vis-à-vis Member States. However, the current Treaty framework presents a series of obstacles to federal-like enforcement. Solutions to national crises must ultimately respect the constitutional balance between the Union and the Member States.
Introduction
Between the spring and summer of 2017, the adoption of controversial pieces of legislation in Hungary and Poland once again stirred the debate on how the EU could While these recent developments may signal that EU institutions are increasingly willing to tackle on-going constitutional crises in the Member States, until today the EU's reaction has been widely considered insufficient and ineffective. VIII Thus, many proposals have been formulated with the aim of strengthening the EU's capacity to respond to constitutional crises in the Member States. IX Several of these proposals seem to have been inspired, explicitly or implicitly, by mechanisms available in federal systems to enforce federal 'values' and the federal constitution vis-à-vis their sub-national entities. In particular, there has been an emphasis on strengthening of judicial procedures, and much of the discussion has been conducted in terms of enforcement of values (Jakab and Kochenov, 2017) .
The aim of this paper is to understand whether 'federal solutions' -that is, replicating mechanisms and procedures available in federal systems -may help the EU in addressing constitutional crises in its Member States. The paper posits the question with reference to two possible models for the EU's intervention: federal systems, and regional and international organisations (IOs) engaged in democracy and human rights' protection. Both types of entities aim to uphold the basic values of their polities, but follow contrasting models. First of all, the nature and relevance of the challenge these entities face depends on the entity. Then they establish procedures through which the central organs can intervene in order to guarantee these values. Whilst the objective is similar -upholding the common values of the system -both the way in which the general clauses are framed, and the procedures that are put in place, are crucially different. This section looks at the general clauses and aims to understand why both types of systems require their Member States' to respect those political values, while section 3 focuses on procedures and mechanisms of enforcement or oversight.
Exploring IOs' clauses first, the best example is Art. 3 of the CoE Statute, which affirms that 'Every member of the Council of Europe must accept the principles of the rule of law and of the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms'. Other regional organisations, in Latin America, XII the Caribbean, XIII and Africa, XIV contain similarly phrased clauses , Closa 2017 . On the other hand, Art. 4 of the UN Charter contains a more generic formulation: 'Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter'. It is in any event argued that these obligations include the human rights norms of the Charter and those created by the other universal UN human rights documents. In several IOs, these clauses are to be found outside the original constitutive documents, in Charters or Declarations attached to them. XV The fact that they are located in successive documents shows the evolution of the mandate of the relevant organisation and also indicates that the inclusion of these clauses is a relatively recent phenomenon. The provisions are often framed in terms of requirements for acquiring membership of the organisation, XVI or as unspecified commitments undertaken by the organisation and its Member States. XVII They almost never define in detail the values to which they refer, nor do they provide clear standards to be respected by the Member States of the organisation.
Within federal systems, one of the basic functions of national constitutions is to declare the basic values of the polity as well as to offer protection for human rights, as seen above.
This is true for unitary, XVIII regional, XIX and also of course federal states. The following analysis covers specifically the latter type of entities. In an analogous way to other state systems, federal constitutions in most cases begin with an enunciation of the basic rights 
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guarantee respect for these general clauses. On closer examination however, the systems may be said to have some significant differences.
In the first place, whereas IOs present their values as requirements for membership, federal states do not make this connection explicit. Even where they still regulate possible accession of new members, such as in Article 4 Section III of the US Constitution, XXVI they do not pose specific conditions for membership. The fact that accession of new entities has been, in most cases, out of the question for decades (at least in ordinary circumstances), has prevented further development of clear policies on the topic.
More significantly, the provisions of the two systems are different in nature, as indicated by the different theoretical frameworks the doctrine has attached to them. In international and regional organisations, the concept most often used is that of 'democracyprotecting clauses' (Closa 2016). In federal states, the reference is to the concept of 'constitutional homogeneity' and the provisions are thus defined as 'homogeneity clauses', a term derived in particular from the German literature (Schmitt 2008) . XXVII What the two concepts evoke is that that the role of the provisions is not identical, despite the similarities in terms of general message and content. More specifically, the two expressions denote different perspectives: IOs adopt an 'external' perspective, while federal systems have a more 'internal' one. In sum, this suggests a different extent of engagement with, and intrusion into, the activities of the sub-entities.
The term 'democracy-protecting clauses' essentially suggests that these provisions are in place to offer an external guarantee to national democratic systems when the latter experience some difficulties. Thus, they offer to international organisation the possibility to intervene -via the procedures analyzed in Section 3 -in cases of crisis, such as military and civil coups d'état, or similar events. Whilst the effects of such a crisis are felt mainly within that particular Member State, the regional or international organisation may claim to have an interest to intervene in order to uphold democracy as a shared value of the system.
However, a national crisis does not directly affect the functioning of the organisation itself, nor other Member States and their citizens. At most, taking measures is a matter of credibility for the organisation and the Member States, which may want to distance themselves from an 'illiberal' state, run by authoritarian figures.
In federal states however, a democratic crisis at the sub-national level affects the entire system more profoundly. The very functioning of the federal system depends on the 
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preservation of the degree of cohesion implied by the concept of 'constitutional homogeneity'. Due to the higher level of interdependence, all the actors of the system feel the effects of a sub-national problem: the central government, other sub-entities, as well as all citizens of the state.
XXVIII The functioning of the whole body of federal law is undermined in these circumstances, and so is the legitimacy of the exercise of power by any authority within the system. This is thus an internal perspective: federal institutions are called to address the crisis primarily to defend their own authority and legitimacy. Art. 2 -democracy, the rule of law, human rights -may disrupt the smooth functioning of EU legislation. This is possibly the most distinguishing feature of the EU as compared to traditional IOs within the ambit of this paper.
To summarise the findings of this section, both IOs and federal systems proclaim in their basic documents their aim to uphold a set of political-constitutional values: most often, they refer to democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. In regional and international organisations this is a recent and growing phenomenon. Provisions of constitutions, statutes, and charters specify conditions for sub-entities. In the case of IOs, this is generally done by establishing membership requirements, while federal states are more explicit in setting conditions for the exercise of authority at the local level. These provisions are however often understood differently. In IOs, they are categorised as 'democracy protecting clauses', while in federal systems as clauses of 'constitutional homogeneity'. The concepts envisage two distinct types of intervention and a different extent of central intervention into local systems. Both types of framework have been applied to the EU, which seems to share some characteristics of both models. However, it
is not entirely comparable to either of the systems. Compared to IOs, the consequences of Member States' constitutional crises are more severe and affect the entire system of the EU. Whilst there are some elements common to federal systems, the EU seems to lack the homogeneity typical of federations and more generally the 'subordination which places the centre above the periphery and empowers it to make demands of the latter' (Hanschel 2017: 265). So, while there is a 'federal dimension' to the crises the EU is facing in Hungary and Poland, the questions raised pose some specific and distinctive dilemmas for EU institutions.
Upholding values in multi-level systems: mechanisms
In addition to the general clauses outlined in the previous section, IOs and federal states also put in place concrete procedures and mechanisms to safeguard democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. This part of the work describes the main models adopted by the two types of bodies and compares the EU procedures to both systems.
Regardless of the diverse institutional arrangements, the procedures of IOs share a number of fundamental features. XXXVIII First, the procedures created are political ones. The political bodies of the organisations representing Member States' national governments take crucial decisions, which in most cases require (at least) a qualified majority. E -52 suspension. The paradigm is thus clear: the organisation and the other Member States distance themselves from the 'undemocratic' one, hoping that political and diplomatic isolation from regional partners would force the government in question to desist from undermining the common values of the organisation. There is no form of direct intervention or enforcement on the ground, but merely the hope that international intervention would mobilize internal opposition. Finally, it must be said that all the institutional designs mentioned above leave a wide margin for states to exercise their discretion on whether or not to tackle a specific breach and eventually apply sanctions. The discretion is evident also in the fact that often the procedures do not provide detailed steps to be followed, but are phrased rather generically. The concrete practice is therefore all but coherent, with frequent accusation of double standards when sanctions are used (Duxbury 2011: 280) .
The range of instruments available to federal systems is radically different. First, federal constitutions put in place a combination of political and legal mechanisms. Judicial actors, in particular federal constitutional courts (or federal supreme courts), therefore play a key role in ensuring that local actors comply with basic values affirmed in the constitution.
Secondly, intervention is allowed even in ordinary cases. This is to say that a violation does not need to be qualified as 'serious'. Finally, a wide range of instruments of enforcement are available, allowing for a more direct interference with the sub-entities. Rather than imposing sanctions, federal systems aim to enforce the common obligations directly and do not rely on the will of the party in question. Mechanisms of coercion are available, as the common values affirmed in the constitution are often considered binding federal law and can be enforced both in ordinary ways, as any other piece of legislation, and also with special procedures. In most cases anyway, it is unnecessary to make use of the special procedures, which are clauses to be used ultima ratio in extreme circumstances. Questions on the enforceability of federal law against local authorities are treated as ordinary questions of compliance, rather than special ones. This, as shall be seen, is not (yet) the case for the EU.
The system in place in Germany offers an adequate illustration of these three fundamental differences. There are of course political channels, which can be used to resolve any conflict between the two levels, both informal and formalized. One of these formal channels is the possibility of 'federal oversight', according to which the Federal Similarly, the bill of rights of the German constitutional court is always applicable, irrespective of which authority exercises its powers in a concrete case. XLVII Furthermore, the FCC has at its disposal a typical instrument of 'militant democracy': banning political parties.
XLVIII
There is also an emergency clause in Art. 37 of the Basic Law -the 'federal execution' or 'federal coercion' clause -, according to which, if and when a Land 'fails to comply with its obligations under [the] Basic Law', the Federal Government 'may take the necessary steps to compel the Land to comply with its duties', after obtaining the consent of the Bundesrat. This is another political mechanism, as is often the case with federal emergency clauses. Art. 37 has never been used and is intended only as a last resort emergency provision. It is nonetheless relevant as it explains extremely well how federal emergency measures differ from those of IOs. As the second section of Art. 37 clarifies, there are in the system of federal execution strong elements of coercion, allowing for direct intervention in the affairs of the Land, which in the most extreme circumstances may even permit the deployment of police and/or armed forces on the ground. XLIX The concrete measures which can be taken, in any case, are not specified in the provision, thus leaving the Federal Government with a wide discretion to take the actions it considers most appropriate to addressing the problem.
A provision modeled on Art. 37 BL can also be found in another European semi- 
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The analysis conducted in these two sections explain the difficulty that the EU faces in protecting its founding values. On the one hand, the EU is obliged to intervene effectively, because constitutional crises in the Member States may affect its credibility, legitimacy, and the very functioning of its political and legal order. This necessity is matched by growing expectations that the EU is able to respond firmly and effectively. On the other hand, the mechanisms that EU institutions have at their disposal are significantly weaker than those available within the scope of EU law. The EU is thus stuck in the middle between more traditional IOs and federal states; whilst the difficulties it encounters may present some federal dimensions, the procedures are largely international in nature. This reading of the current crises has led several authors to suggest a federalization of the system in order to better protect democracy, the rule of law and human rights.
A federal turn? Ideas and obstacles
It remains to be seen whether federal procedures such as those mentioned above can provide a platform for strengthening the EU's mechanisms, what the likely obstacles to the development in a federal sense of EU values' oversight are, and the possible alternatives to a federal transformation. This fourth section of the paper reflects on a possible reconfiguration of the EU system in a federal sense, assessing its feasibility and desirability.
The analysis conducted moves from the constitutional framework offered by the current Treaties: of course, a fully-fledged 'federal (r)evolution' would certainly be possible in abstract, but the current political climate makes it rather unlikely. Thus, the paper considers possible federal developments within the current Treaty framework.
Among the several proposals formulated by institutional and academic actors, as a reaction in particular to the Hungarian and Polish constitutional crises, many seem to have been inspired, explicitly or implicitly, by mechanisms available to federal systems. There has been a certain emphasis on strengthening judicial procedures to ensure common values, broadening the mandate of the CJEU and/or of national courts as EU courts. Reliance on legal actors -mostly constitutional courts -is a feature which has been described as common to federations, and absent in IOs. Thus, some scholars have attempted to find ways to improve the enforcement of values, once again adopting a formulation closer to As may already be evident from the illustration of the proposals, the current constitutional framework presents several obstacles to the deployment of 'federal means' in order to protect the Union's common values. These obstacles are both legal and theoretical. Firstly, there is Art. 7 itself, which, as seen above, does not employ a federal paradigm and almost completely excludes the CJEU from the system. In relation especially to the proposal of systemic infringement actions, it can be argued that Art. Then there is Art. 51 of the EUCFR. During the drafting of the Charter, the Member States, were acutely aware of the potential federal effect of such a document, and were careful in limiting the scope of its application. They therefore stressed that the Charter 'does not extend the field of application of Union law beyond the powers of the Union or establish any new power or task for the Union, or modify powers and tasks as defined in the Treaties'. Moreover, Art. 51 added that 'The provisions of this Charter are addressed … to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law'. The language of Art. 51 suggested a scope of application more limited than the traditional case law of the CJEU, which had already declared that its jurisdiction extended to reviewing Member States' measures derogating from Union law. The situation was clarified by the CJEU in Akerberg Fransson, when it was held that 'where national legislation falls within the scope of European Union law, situations cannot exist which are covered in that way by European Union law without those fundamental rights being applicable'.
LXXIII To put it simply, where EU law applies, the EUCFR applies. However, the clarification is limited, because it remains difficult and controversial to ascertain when EU law applies (Fontanelli 2013).
Even in the absence of a clear answer to this question, there are no dobuts that Art. 51 still poses limits to the scope of application of the Charter. In other words, there will still be cases where the Charter does not apply, because the matter does not fall within the scope of EU law.
LXXIV
It may be too simplistic to say that the proposals illustrated above do not take into sufficient account what the law is, but the limitation of Art. 51 of the EUCFR is so explicit that it can hardly be ignored, even more so when considering that the intention of the drafters of the provision was clearly to limit the applicability of the Charter. Jakab's rebuttal (Jakab 2017: 199) is not entirely convincing: while it is true that the CJEU in other leading cases has gone against the apparent wording of a Treaty provision, LXXV in this context there is no ambiguity and there is the obvious desire of the drafters to prevent that effect. The
Court of Justice would go explicitly contra legem, and its legitimacy would most likely be severely affected, were it to take that decision. On the other hand, the Heidelberg group attempts to square the provision of Art. 51 with their Reverse Solange doctrine, via Union E -62 citizenship and the concept of 'essence' of fundamental rights. In practice, however, the proposal would also envisage an application of the Charter to cases currently excluded by Art. 51, and it is questionable whether the Court has the authority and the legitimacy to take such a step.
Finally, there is a set of theoretical arguments relating to the current nature of the EU and of the integration process, supported by the provision of Art. 4(2) of the TEU, protecting the national and constitutional identity of Member States. As seen in Section 2, some authors have argued that the framework of constitutional homogeneity is not applicable to the EU framework, since there is a great diversity in terms of the institutional LXXVI EU values are informed by national conceptions and at the same time they aim to shape the development of national values. This is in contrast to federal experience, where the monopoly of the interpretation of constitutional values rests with constitutional or supreme courts, and a common uniform conception is sought and then exported to the sub-entities. In the EU, however, it seems hardly desirable to transform this conception of the integration process through judicial procedures, in the absence of a conscious political choice.
In conclusion, the federal solutions proposed seem to be not only legally infeasible, but also undesirable at the moment. To be more precise, it is not desirable that these solutions are adopted without explicit political deliberations. The traditional 'integration through law' model as shaped by Court's decisions does not seem fit for this type of constitutional questions with a strong political component.
Conclusions: Upholding values and the EU constitutional balance
While a federal turn may be neither a feasible nor a desirable solution, EU institutions still have the responsibility to offer effective answers to on-going constitutional crises. The question has a crucial importance for the EU legal and political order, as recognised in section 2 of this work. But solutions cannot be imported from other contexts, either from federal systems or from the experience of other international and regional organisations.
The EU and its own institutions should strive to find distinctive solutions, which acknowledge and respect the current constitutional balance between the Union and the Member States.
It is not the aim of this work to offer a detailed analysis of new solutions, but more modestly to identify some guidelines, which may contribute to finding a possible pattern for EU's intervention. In the first place, the EU should make full use of existing procedures and frameworks. This includes both the more political mechanism, including Art. 7 and especially its preventive arm, and legal ones. It is precisely a combination of the political and legal instruments available that may produce better results than those achieved so far. This combination has not been attempted until very recently; the Commission Structural funds' conditionality is an option to be considered and studied, although it raises complex constitutional and technical questions. But also, and perhaps more significantly, the EU could aim to identify clearer standards and develop common conceptions of the values of Art. 2. 'Mainstreaming' values into secondary law is one option to be pursued, but the EU may also aim to draft guidelines or a checklist similar to the one approved by the Venice Commission. LXXIX It is important, however, that the process involves national actors, and it is not perceived as an imposition from the center to the periphery. 
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Finally, it should be acknowledged that finding an effective solution to current challenges requires more than legal or doctrinal tricks, or a ruling of the CJEU. Upholding constitutionalism requires an intervention in the societal and cultural dimension too.
LXXX
The EU is not the only player in the field. It is therefore crucial that national actors perceive its intervention as legitimate and objective, otherwise it may become counterproductive. In order to avoid this, EU institutions should be careful not to overstep the boundaries of the current constitutional settlement, including the principle of national and constitutional identity. 
